By Chief Michael D. Chiaramonte CFO, MIFireE

The ABC Fire Department received a call for a working fire in a local, newly constructed, pharmacy. When they arrived there was heavy smoke throughout and fire showing in the rear of the building. Lines were charged and two hand lines were committed to the interior. After several minutes of firefighting the roof collapsed trapping four firefighters inside. Fortunately, in this scenario all four firefighters were rescued. Upon investigation it was found that the building used truss construction and the department did not have a preplan of the building. The incident commander had a hard time dealing with his decisions that night and kept thinking, "If I had only known." It is increasingly important for all firefighters and officers to have a good knowledge of building construction and its relationship to fire behavior. It is also essential that every fire department know the type and methods of construction of each structure in that department's response area.

In 2007 there were over 19 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. The U.S. Fire Administration stated the following in a report entitled Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse written in 2003, "Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities." Five years have gone by and not much has changed. It is a shame that in this day and age, with the technology we have and the major advances in equipment and gear, that we are STILL killing firefighters, many of which are in structural situations. Studies show that:

• The percentage of collapse fatalities that occurred in residential properties has increased.
• Collapse fatalities are generally caused in two ways:
  • By being caught or trapped in the structure or
  • By being struck by an object
  • The percentage of collapse fatalities caused by being caught or trapped in the structure has increased.
• A majority (over 65%) of collapse fatalities occurred during fire attack.

Is it as simple as pausing, slowing down and looking up once in a while?

It is the purpose of this article to reexamine the issue of firefighter fatalities resulting from structural collapse. It will look at some specific fire service incidents resulting in multiple firefighter deaths related to structural collapse. The information presented is based on the individual incident reports written by the U.S. Fire Administration. It is recommended that these reports are studied in their entirety by each and every fire department in the nation for the purposes of ascertaining the lessons learned and to develop policies and procedures for safe and effective firefighting.

Case #1 - 2 Firefighters lost in Memphis Church Fire

Critical Factors:

• The church had a lightweight wood truss roof system.
• The attic was involved above and beyond the area where most of the crews were operating.

Deaths resulted from roof collapse.

Lessons Learned:

• Awareness and concern about the hazards of lightweight construction need to be increased throughout the fire service.
• All firefighters must recognize that this type of structure can collapse suddenly and without warning after a relatively short period of fire involvement.
• The only reliable way to be aware of lightweight wood truss construction is to pre-fire plan all structures and make sure that these plans are available to all responding companies.
• There must be a system in place to ensure that the appropriate officers are made aware of the key structural information on dispatch or while en route to the scene of the fire.
• A policy needs to be adopted requiring buildings with this type of construction to be marked with a distinctive symbol that is visible from the street.
• City Ordinances that mandate advance notice to firefighters of any building within corporate limits with truss features must be aggressively pursued.
• Building construction and fire behavior should be actively taught to all firefighters and especially to officers.
• SOP's and SOG's should be developed concerning various construction methods and types.
• An aggressive and functional company level inspection program should be initiated and the information gathered should be documented and maintained by each fire company.

Critical Factors:

• The four original structures appeared to be more than 100 years old and had been altered many times over the years.
• The buildings had thick outer walls and a pair of back-to-back double course brick walls extending from front to rear.
• The roof was supported by heavy wood joists.
• 3x10 wood joists supported the floor.
• Death resulted from floor collapse

• Officers must track the passage of time and assume a fire that cannot be located may be a moving threat.
• Buildings that are old and have been renovated numerous times are often exceptionally dangerous to firefighters.
• Thermal imaging cameras are a valuable tool and must be used to detect hidden structural damage that may endanger firefighters.
• Age and structural types of buildings as well as renovation information must be noted on pre-fire plans.

Critical Factors:

• The building was renovated several times for various occupancies.
• There were no exterior stairs or fire escapes.
• The basement foundation walls were concrete, and the exterior walls above were brick over terracotta tile construction. A portion of the basement was separated from the main area by brick walls.
• The floors were concrete; the first floor surface was finished with terrazzo and tile in different areas and the upper floor surface had been covered with wood.

Death resulted from being trapped from a partial floor collapse.

Lessons Learned:

• Unprotected steel construction is extremely vulnerable to rapid failure under fire exposure. This needs to be clearly understood by firefighters.
• Access and exit conditions of buildings should be noted in all pre-fire plans.
• Serious fire prevention code violations in various buildings that are identified as risks in the department's response area should be known by firefighters and fire officers.
• Analysis of fire conditions must be done constantly during a fire operation (Hot floor, increasing smoke and heat in the basement, smoke pushing out between the wall and the sidewalk, cracking and popping noises).
• The "20 minute rule"* should be used as a guideline in making an assessment of structural conditions. In the case of unprotected steel, this "rule" can be an overly generous time allowance, while it would be extremely conservative for fire resistive construction.
  • * The "20 Minute rule" is based on the body of experience which suggests that an "ordinary construction" building (non-fire resistive) should be considered vulnerable to structural collapse after 20 minutes of fire involvement.

As one can see by the case studies above, there is a great deal that needs to be learned about the relationship of building construction and fire behavior. This type of knowledge will save firefighters lives. It is essential that more emphasis be placed on this type of education in every fire academy across the nation and that it be reinforced on a constant basis in frequent drills and seminars in every fire station in America. This is just another way to make sure that Everyone Goes Home.

Just think, if the fire officer mentioned in the introduction to this article had a good knowledge of building construction and its relationship to fire behavior, he might not be kicking himself. He would not be wishing he knew about truss construction and that the fire building was, in fact, that type of construction. REMEMBER KNOW YOUR ENEMY!!!

Also In This Issue:
» What's it Going to Take?

Related:
» USFA Technical Report Series: Wood Truss Roof Collapse Claims Two Firefighters (Memphis, TN)
» USFA Technical Report Series: Floor Collapse Claims Two Firefighters (Pittston, PA)
» USFA Technical Report Series: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse (Brackenridge, PA)